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                              Abstract 
    
The exponential growth of immigration crisis and 
the recent terrorism cases revealed the increase of 
fraud occurrences, cloning and identity theft with 
numerous social, economic and political consequences. 
The trustworthiness of biometrics during verification 
processes has been compromised by spoofing attackers 
sprang up to exploit the security gaps. Additionally, the 
cryptography’s role in the area is highly important as 
it may promote fair assessment procedures and foster 
public trust by serving the demands for 
proportionality, reducing the concerns about national 
surveillance. Literature efforts are devoted to studying 
model threats and problems raised by targeted 
malicious actions for biometric techniques. However, 
attacks against multi-modal crypto-biometric systems 
have not received much attention. This paper presents 
cryptosystems, intrusions and countermeasures for 
single, multiple modalities and complicated schemes. 
Finally, a novel bimodal privacy friendly cryptosystem 
is suggested, able to reject such kind of attacks, 
presenting an anti-spoofing behavior under the 
cooperation between user and the function. The aim of 
this multidisciplinary work is to organize the current 
performances on how to develop security, contribute to 
research by designs able to address real-world use 
cases and pinpoint the potentiality for improvements. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Until relatively recently, biometric enabled systems 
have replaced the traditional forms of individuals’ 
recognition of his/her presence, access to facilities or 
log in to an account as their traits can be very 
discriminative yet less easily lost or stolen. Automated 
identity management, using face, hand or fingerprints, 
has become an experience in everyday life, mainly due 
to their diffusion in technologies such as electronic 
passports or IDs. From border control, to log on 
computers, mailing and eBanking services, biometrics 
constitute a unique and integral part of the user, to 
whom are associated with, and this is a serious tangible 
reason for being vulnerable to activities that threat to 
compromise not only reliability of the application, but 
also security and privacy rights of the person [11]. 
A closer look at the explanation for any extensive 
attack to fields related to biometrics will lead to the 
nature of the data, the personal non-biometric 
information that may be stored and correlated or other 
private facts such as the medical condition of the user 
that may be enclosed and revealed on occasions where 
someone’s identity is not appropriately protected. In 
terms of spoofing, a non-colluding honest entity tries to 
fake somebody else’s identity by presenting samples of 
that person’s traits, or tries to gain benefit from the 
“leakage” of stored biometric information in a database 
or an electronic chip. Considering the special 
assumption when a biometric trait is compromised, 
then it cannot be canceled and renewed, hence 
moreover, it seems critical that may be used to create 
gelatin genetic clones of fingerprints, contact lens with 
a copy of iris or retinal scans, artificial replicas of 
faces,  facial samples in the form of photographs, a 
video or a 3D mask. Voice or even gait can be 
recorded, inducing a system to falsely infer a presence 
under another’s identity. A behavioral biometric such 
as signature, handwriting are not stolen, under the 
classical term, but can be easily mimicked and used to 
a certain degree for illegal means. These concerns have 
given space to public debates on the pressing matter of  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
confidence in authorized, biometry compulsive 
systems and therefore, societal, ethical themes.  
As an address to the challenges of strengthened 
privacy for human characteristics, a range of  standards 
and security methodologies have been suggested. 
Standard conventional cryptographic algorithms have 
been characterized, simply, as not enough, as a result 
of not allowing and supporting comparison between 
template and fresh sample caught on sensor, thus 
making the system possibly to be cheated. In this 
philosophy, biometric template protection schemes 
have been deployed. The paramount idea is the secured 
form of the stored template, making it unusable 
without authorization, but still capable for recognition 
its true energetic owner. The approaches try to follow 
the requirements of accuracy, irreversibility, diversity, 
unlinkability, revocability. At the direction of 
enhancing security, privacy information  and overcome 
drawbacks in both areas, the combinations of 
biometrics with cryptography techniques were born 
[9]. Crypto-biometric systems or biometric 
cryptosystems, as they are denoted in this paper, 
respect the previously referred compulsions and 
additionally can obtain cryptographic/crypto-bio keys 
strongly linked to the user’s identity. 
Although crypto-biometrics propose alternative 
solutions, biometric recognition systems are still 
suffering and sometimes defeated by intruders. 
Vulnerabilities primarily include direct and indirect 
attacks performed at the sensor level, or 
correspondingly, inside the parts of the system, such as 
communication channels, storage domain, feature and 
matcher extractions. Direct operations happen when an 
attacker tries to masquerade as a valid and authorized 
user by changing his/her biometric characteristics, 
claiming a different identity posing himself/herself or 
presenting false traits. Surprisingly, multi-biometric 
systems, based on their sources, separated to multi -
sensors, -recorded samples, -algorithmics, -units and -
modals, are constitute a more difficult, but not 
impossible target. Ideally, several mechanisms have 
been tried for the defense of security for the involved 
items in a system, with controversial results. From a 
realistic point of research, academic and industrial 
trials on detection, encryption and anti-spoofing 
measures have been proposed to deal, in some extent, 
with these threats. 
In addition to these, admittedly, there has never 
been a proposed model on how best biometrics 
applications can be secured, especially those ones that 
are related to governmental and organizational 
purposes [11]. The proposals for centralized database 
systems including information for national ID cards or 
passports bring about a feeling of discomfort,  
reinforcing the assertions wherein biometrics have seen 
intrinsically as privacy’s foe. Conversely, keeping pace 
with technological changes, biometric schemes as a 
modern and sometimes mandatory key to validate 
transactions must also be given the capacity and the 
resources to deal with millions of expected requests, 
always respecting their primary objectives of data 
minimization, accuracy, transparency, confidentiality 
etc. Template protection models should prevent the 
re/generation of the original template from the initial, 
and the laws should strictly be followed to ensure their 
acceptance from citizens.  
This study is motivated by recent advances in the 
scientific field of biometric system security, and 
protected templates to ensure the secrecy of person’s 
identity. Its target is to present and add new 
information to the studies against fraud processes to 
biometric based verification technologies, something 
that since 2012 is indicated as well, from the increasing 
number of projects aim to suggest ideas for preventing 
risks, directly applicable to special issues, such as 
border control. Our essential objective here is to clarify 
the role of cryptology in biometrics, and examine how 
honest is the statement for a safe and reliable biometric 
application environment, when this is constantly 
exposed to human mind’s contrivances. The remainder 
of the article is organized as follows: In the next two 
sections, a thorough summarized review on research 
articles is analyzed, particularly on the development of 
standard metrics, protocols and datasets for the 
appraisal of the progress, introducing readers to 
enlightenment. The fourth part is devoted to single 
and/or multi-biometric cryptosystems, spoofing 
attacks, and resistance processes. Fifth section aims to 
present the design of an innovative multi-modal model. 
It is a suggestion capable of being used in electronic 
passport applications based on liveness detection and 
RFID access control as combined mechanisms for 
reinforcement the cryptographic bearing against 
spoofing. The privacy standards and principals are also 
discussed, while a standard evaluation methodology 
which is needed to assess the influence of 
countermeasures on biometric system performance is 
indicated. As a conclusion, comprehensive remarks 
together with some directions for future approaches are 
listed, providing food for thought. 
 
2. Preliminaries on crypto-biometrics 
 
2.1. Biometric cryptosystems  and protocols 
 
Approaches towards security of biometric 
technologies are briefly presented in this section. The 
variety of the concepts are divided to schemes that 
aspire to transform the aforementioned data, reducing 
the possibilities for generation of the initial trait used 
during the enrollment phase, and to cryptosystems  that 
combine known cryptographic functions to derive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
cryptographic keys from biometric data. A uniform 
classification of the various techniques  according to 
their functionality is described diagrammatically in 
Figure 1. In the first division, encryption, hashing, 
transformation and other cryptographic techniques 
produce one-bit verification for biometric systems. 
Next in order, data are used to obtain keys that further 
will be used as an extra secured method. Ordinary 
biometric systems requires prior a database which 
contains stored biometric or non-biometric references 
to the data for further comparison causes. The lack of 
revocability for each of these pieces and the very 
existence of a place from where information could be 
leaked, leading to numerous concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 1. Categories of crypto-biometric systems 
 
For this reason and following the lines of the 
diagram, classical encryption of biometric data, such as 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) technique, 
the trait collaborates with one, or more secrets, similar 
to passwords that can be stored also in a token or smart 
card, preserving diversity. Cancellable biometrics 
category has been studied extensively and inspired 
various designs for other proposed methodologies. The 
fundamental ideology can be found in the one-way 
function re/irre-versible feature transformations, where 
there is luxury for multiple transformed templates and 
their uses across applications, under the same identity. 
At the second cryptosystems’ family, the creation and 
reissuance of keys from biometric data constitute a 
remarkable and template-free concept. There is a 
cryptographic framework that is used to securely store 
just a key born after enrollment and released only over 
successful verification. This key can be irrelevant or 
stable bit-string directly extracted from biometrics and 
in binding approaches can be regenerated, as it is 
combined with the biometric data using cryptography 
and possible  to be retrieved, later [17]. 
Protocols for re-generation crypto-biometrics in 
systems are come to address the specific ways on how 
to share the keys between the untrusted parties of an 
authorized user/client and an intended server’s 
principle, and as a field lacks of research progress. 
Symmetric-key cryptography is fast but too risky, on 
the grounds that several cryptanalytic attacks can occur 
in the event of using a single key for a large scale 
application. Public key suggestions are vulnerable to 
other kinds of attacks and initially they do not include 
the verification of authenticity to each entity. To 
overcome the limitations, protocols designs help to 
share the crypto-bio keys or create secure authenticated 
sessions based on biometrics [9].  
Taking advantage of this collective knowledge on 
the core technologies of both biometrics and 
cryptography, pseudo-identities based mostly on 
fingerprint characteristics have been carefully chosen 
during the initial design phase to accomplish a 
workable trustworthy and friendly scheme that serves 
principals of user’s privacy [18]. The typical 
architecture of a related ecosystem is based on the 
independent generation of references coming directly 
from live biometric samples or already stored 
biometric templates which after their use as parameters 
to the embed and non-invertible, one-way, yet unique, 
functions are finally fully deleted/destroyed. The 
encoder verifies the identity and builds additional 
auxiliary data. These information may serve the 
purposes of interoperability. The methodology is 
considered to be successful when the final non-
biometric data can provide multiple renewable and 
protected templates, independent pseudo identities for 
the same individual within an application able to be 
used across other systems to prevent database cross-
matching and linking, preventing impersonation and 
providing data separation for people with similar 
features and ability to handle a duplicate enrollment 
check scenario.  
Back to the process, at the second phase, some 
supplementary data like knowledge-based secrets to be 
entered by the enrollee (e.g. passwords, signature, 
secrets) are used as an input to the pseudo-identity 
encoder and their string is not stored. During 
verification process, re-creation of a pseudo-identity or 
directly verification a previously stored pseudo-identity 
based on a provided recognition sample is performed. 
The transformation of information and the provided 
auxiliary data are also used and of course the same 
supplementary data from the user. The comparator 
compares both elements or identities  to check if 
originally coming from the first subject. Validity 
checks and expiration can be controlled especially for 
characteristics that can change with the passing of the 
years. Revocation is also available, in case of deleting 
the pseudo identity from a database, and/or removing 
the authorization, then the re-enrollment may result in 
a new protected template. Figure 2 presents the creation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
and verification of protected templates by pseudo-
identities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Biometric protection on pseudo-identities 
 
Indubitably, in every scenario, the verification 
performance and the evaluation of the overall function 
of the crypto-biometric systems largely depend and 
based on the baseline of its system. The error 
correcting codes algorithms are used to improve the 
degrades and analyze any perspectives able to change, 
in a better level, each approach. The important factors 
are the adoption of multi-biometrics as an emerging 
development, understanding that obtaining high 
entropy keys is still a challenging, but encouraging 
issue. The use of passwords, tokens, electronic 
documents or smart cards can secure user’s privacy, 
the appropriate secured sharing of the keys based on 
totally untrusted involved sides on a system and the 
ability to combine basic elements from each category 
suffice to design new complete hybrid systems. 
 
2.2. Hotspots at biometric systems 
 
The security breaches directly or indirectly, as 
described above, may aim towards different parts in 
system modules. Eight categories are used for notice 
the points for possible threats, such as the generic 
scheme in Figure 3 portrays. The frame symbolizes the 
inner aura and attacks that can take place in that are 
further divided into three groups [2]. Threats at the 
communication channels between different parts of the 
system, attacks to the feature and matcher extractors, 
those ones that could take place under the assumption 
of the database of information is compromised. The 
direct, also known as spoofing attacks are substantially 
described at the next subsection and here indicated as 
the first spot at the level of sensor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Eight areas in emergency 
An analytical outlook to indirect attacks involves a 
deviant and the communication tunnel between user 
and the valid end system’s controller. The attacker 
must mainly know specific information about the 
process of the whole application, the template format, 
the scores, communications protocol, the data 
transmission elements and can perform an access to all 
its stages. In this way, the intruder can gain the 
extraction, changing, deleting, adding of important data 
on identities. Specifically, the communication channels 
across consecutive parts of the system can be 
intercepted by an eavesdropper who changes 
surreptitiously the messages in the link, manipulates 
the scores, decisions and results or makes brute force 
attacks by exhaustively trying to find the input that can 
unlock the region of interest. During the pre-processing 
and feature extraction progresses, insertion of impostor 
data and component replacement can happen, while the 
same could take place as well at the matcher level with 
the hill-climbing algorithms, consisting on iteratively 
changing some synthetically generated templates until 
the right one is found. Lastly, the database’s region is 
characterized as imperatively dangerous and involves 
malicious tampering at the templates from  reading to 
modifications of the links between biometric data, 
increasing privacy concerns. 
 
3. Comprehensive literature review 
 
3.1. Spoofing attacks 
 
In the case of spoofing attacks that may take place 
directly towards the initial level of sensor, a zero-effort 
or active impostor tries to positively claim a different 
identity deceiving the acquisition system. The means 
of this kind attack are highly depended on the type and 
quality of design and application. For the first 
mentioned, an unauthorized person uses his/her own 
trait that by mistake can be matched to a template. This 
cascade effect happens due to dysfunctional false 
acceptance rates of a system that make it vulnerable. 
Obfuscation intents are carried out without the 
requirement of advanced technical skills, by presenting 
a counterfeited stolen, copied, replicated biometric and 
the range includes gummy fingerprints, photos, three 
dimensional-3D shaped models or falsification of 
facial characteristics using make-up, plastic surgery, 
imitations or short video clips for gait, signature or 
handwriting, recorded speech modality and voice 
conversion, high resolution pictures of iris or even 
ears. To sum up, sophisticated cheaters have constantly 
managed to artistically fool the most smart computer 
devices simply by taking the advantage of the 
increasing popularity of social network websites where 
photographs are available, such as facebook, 
instagram, youtube etc. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Research has proved that none scheme is 
completely spoof-proof, since almost all commercial 
devices by private security firms are defeated after this 
kind of attack. However, the issue is not about the 
hacked systems but people and this is a particular 
challenge, not only in criminal, but also in civil 
matters. The implications are gradually increased 
across different devices and public services. Depending 
on the position of the attack, recently published works 
have managed to categorize and evaluate them with 
regards to the scores of rates that a system can 
demonstrate when it is threaten. Insufficient, sub-
optimal, optimal and super-optimal attacks constitute 
the terminology for spoofing acts [4]. 
From an ethical perspective, a deceiver can claim 
an identity and gain access to private data or parallel 
information that may lead him/her to someone’s car, 
mobile, computer, house, electronic passport, totally 
ruining a personality in society. A decade ago, all these 
would be heard like a myth or seen as a movie 
scenario, nevertheless, nowadays persons may well 
consider such information intimate and part of a 
broadly acceptable status quo, and hence demand a 
vigilance attitude from companies and authorities, with 
skeptical position against any alarming behavior could 
threaten their interests. Undoubtedly, it remains really 
hard for non specialists to assess the security-low-level 
parts of a system and perfectly compose their plan, but 
still there is the belief about those who if they are 
motivated will find an idea on how to get around any 
barriers used to protect the targeted system [10]. To 
overcome these arguments, applications should be 
designed following the security level needed according 
to its potential purpose, the scale of the data and 
concurrently follow privacy by design rules, covering 
the ISO Standards, respecting legal provisions. 
 
3.2. Anti-spoofing countermeasures 
 
Up to this point, in research community different 
methods have been suggested for facing this long-
neglected problem against many biometric modes, 
referred as anti-spoofing, spoof detection or 
presentation attack detection. By definition, their role 
is to confer a highly positive characterization about 
system’s trustworthiness [7]. In this way, the major 
objective is to ensure the protected environment of an 
application which can recognize only genuine users 
and not detect and prevent spoofing attacks, as is 
mistakenly believed. Having this in mind, the questions 
about the huge chasm between research results and 
real-world applications can be answered [15]. Minding 
the gap, the technology of a biometric verification 
system should contain by design the incorporation of 
mechanisms that reject spoofing attacks and are under 
alliance with the parts of the final system 
considerations and characterize its overall 
susceptibility.  
One the most familiar and user-comfort technique 
that is used for increasing the awkwardness to spoof a 
system are passwords or smart cards, offering the 
opportunity for supervising the verification process. 
Although the way has been successfully, at some 
percentage, practiced on transactions, other recognition 
applications that require communication between 
services and enrolled person, such as travelers’ checks, 
need other anti-spoofing methods, involving the 
combination of multi-modal biometrics for one identity 
and liveness detection. Human physiologic information 
do not indicate that the person who is present at the 
time of capture is actually alive. Liveness detection 
tests some data inherent to the biometric or additional 
processing of information captured by reader to extract 
contextual, discriminating features or extra hardware. 
On the same wavelength, pulse oximetry, 
electrocardiogram, palm vein, keystroke, typing 
rhythm, gait, ear acoustic properties, finger/hand 
temperature sensing, facial thermograms as continuous 
authentication mechanisms and challenge/response 
actions describe the cooperation of the user who 
provides unintentionally or must do something, a blink, 
pupil, lip or head movement, allowing the system to 
understand his/her real presence. 
Algorithms, freshly proposed countermeasures, 
standards, protocols and recorded databases for further 
analysis have received upsurge attention, with varying 
degrees of spoofing vulnerability, covering a range of 
attack scenarios and acquisition conditions [13]. 
Methods are classified in three categories, firstly, a real 
living body possess color, texture, elasticity and 
supplementary intrinsic properties, which can be used 
to check the validity, human expressions, reflex and 
involuntary signals are secondly grouped. Finally, 
coming from traditional forensic environments, the 
collected trait is examined for spotting clues of forgery 
of friction ridge skin clarity. Academic and industrial 
projects choose the baseline, plot the licit/normal 
scenarios and the error rates criteria for the 
experiments, conducting on freely datasets, available 
for offline work, containing samples for different 
modalities. Among the most “overused” evaluated 
biometrics are fingerprints, iris and face, due to their 
widely accepted distinctiveness [10]. 
Respectively, face presentation potential can be 
handled by subject-specific 3D facial masks which 
analyze local binary patterns based measures. A 
powerful way to eliminate similar threats are the 
background motion correlation and texture of the 
surrounding facial region quality measurements, 
something that could be useful especially to more 
realistic scenarios [19]. For fingerprints, algorithms 
that can perform an analysis about the capture of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
multiple samples of a biometric instance in a short time 
frame are combined with those that allow live 
detection and segmentation of the finger, including 
defenses against gelatin, gummy and silicon samples 
and others that offer processing of the photo with 
graphical operations, enabling a convenient thought 
about how to capture multiple views of modality from 
different fingers from one subject. The results prove 
well-promising rates, even though the existence of a 
purely incapable of being deceived climate system is 
simply a utopia, under the current circumstances. A 
novel multi-spectral approach to manage these 
challenges is to use the proposed cascade structures as 
a part of a larger anti-spoofing solution that involves 
multiple modalities from the user, his/her movements 
to justify the presence, algorithms that overcome the 
noises, simulate light reflections, determine the scene 
motion, fixations, speed, acceleration, or even 
anticipate video replay attacks. The developments may 
be evaluated through test protocols, applied to more 
comprehensive databases, and meanwhile the 
techniques should to be based on specific frameworks, 
supporting larger scales and each generalization need 
to be carefully controlled. 
 
4. Mutli-biometric cryptosystems 
 
4.1. Attacks 
 
The technologies of multi or single biometric 
cryptosystems have been encountered to infiltrate 
systems, preventing from some malicious 
performances, while remain exposed to classic 
spoofing ones. Briefly, it is pointed out that a skillful 
adversary has to know additional transform parameters 
or secret keys to defeat the area with previously 
enrolled samples, since both categories used to 
cooperate with helper data or are bound to 
cryptographic techniques and tokens. In such a 
condition, reconstruction of the original template, and 
consequently its raw usage or the synthesization of 
fake physical biometrics, is greatly complicated. The 
multi-modalities for one identity offer the advantage of 
extremely low false acceptance attacks in a tampering 
hypothesis. On the contrary, if a single trait is 
compromised then the whole template can be 
recovered, when a blended replacement attack take 
place, where subject and attacker’s template and 
distinct parts of larger sets are merged into one [20].  
Cancellable approaches transform non/-invertibly 
can unlock the genuine user’s biometric or some 
elements of it, respectively [12]. Fuzzy commitment 
schemes and vaults, which are related to entropy rates 
and wittily hiding the biometric (e.g. minutiae and 
chaff points for fingerprints), are vulnerable if the 
algorithms are poor. Helper data and key-re-generation 
schemes extracting short keys or suffering from 
improper accuracy present high tolerance, making 
achievable the composition of an approximation of the 
initial biometric from its hashes. Coercitive, device 
substitution intrusions and any possible combination of 
serial venomous acts could be applied sufficiently, 
compounding a worst possible scenario, but rather 
unrealistic in everyday contexts.  
Since it remains still necessary to test the robustness 
of multi-modal biometric systems, especially for 
combinations such as face-fingerprint or/and face-iris, 
under various realistic hypotheses, recent studies [14] 
conducted some experiments. This analysis may allow 
figuring out to what extent each balanced 
countermeasure is representative of the performance. 
The relevant endeavor was based on established state-
of-the-art authentication technologies for each 
modality and different combinations of attacking story 
lines using datasets of spoofed templates or traits. The 
final comments led us to the denouement that multi-
modal schemes suffer from lack of unsuitable strong 
protection for their template, as the design of optimized 
fusion rules is currently under research. At the very 
least, attacking assumptions are too pessimistic and 
result in a significant overestimation of the false 
acceptance rates, a case that turned out to be positively 
reassuring, but certainly non-effective for more 
advanced and elaborate intrusions. 
 
4.2. Resistance 
 
Response-focused methodology on the basis of 
possibility to integrate liveness detection or the 
mentioned anti-spoofing methods include experimental 
investigations to verify whether and to what extent 
multi-modal verification systems could be assessed as 
securely protected. Until now, studies on spoofing 
underline that using multi-biometrics, the recognition 
performance is higher but unfortunately unimodal 
approaches handle better external attacks [3], [5]. To 
reduce the risk of exposure of the combined template, 
if a single trait revealed, the selection of other 
biometrics, akin to hand-fingerprint, face-iris, instead 
of multiple fingerprint samples, for example, is 
recommended, based on empirical evidences. For 
increasing robustness, the design of stronger fusion 
rules (score or feature level are recommended) between 
samples is mandatory. Additionally, cryptosystems and 
especially crypto-bio keys ideas for multi-modalities 
are not only more efficient than mono-modal ones, but 
simultaneously privacy friendly. These suggestions 
pretend to bring some insight into the difficult problem 
of evaluation through the effective countermeasures 
that can minimize the effects of threats by taking into 
consideration the techniques of fusion, the serial or 
parallel modes, the type of cryptographic algorithms, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
complexion of the application according to the 
hardware and its interconnects [20]. Finally, we 
emphasize that any protection mechanism should 
respect design principles and keep the overall balance 
of the system, without underestimating that extra 
efforts can bring about the cost of sharply reduction of 
verification performance.   
 
5. Bimodal person verification system 
 
People from dozens of nations have already 
acquired their new electronic passport equipped with 
contactless chip that stores personal data. The 
expansion of illegal occurrences in this area increases 
the lack of public trust with numerous privacy, 
physical safety, and psychological comfort 
consequences [7], [10]. As a counterweight for the 
theoretical analysis of the previous sections, Figure 4 
introduces a bimodal biometric model for person 
identification made up of face and fingerprint, or face 
and iris matchers. The framework is a bold initiative in 
the deployment of three technologies: crypto-
biometrics, anti-spoofing countermeasures and Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID). This ePassport idea is 
inspired by previous works on spoofing for biometrics 
[4] and designs to defeat attacks through 
implementations of RFID authentication protocols and 
data encryption, increasing the complexity and 
therefore robustness [16], while cryptographically 
advocating the secrecy requirements for biometric data, 
which is mandatory for identity documents schemes 
[6], [11].   
 
5.1. Function and the design process 
 
During enrollment a pair of datasets is collected. To 
preserve the principals of protection of user’s privacy, 
the created template consists of transformed minimal 
elements of the initial biometrics binded together under 
a cryptographic algorithm which uses them to create 
keys. The extended version of this deployment can be 
understood as this part was explained previously in 
Section 2, Subsection 2.1, paragraph for biometric 
template protection based on pseudo-identities. The 
scheme involves auxiliary data delivered from the 
involved hardware, authority etc. The supplementary 
data in our design coming from the liveness detection 
process. The final non-biometric information stored on 
ePassport’s chip are the crypto-bio key, which can be 
unlocked only when both biometrics are matched, 
traveler’s personal details and document’s type, digital 
number, etc.  
The description of the anti-spoofing verification 
system involves liveness detection method combined 
with the current RFID access control process. When a 
user approaches to an E-Gate for automatic passport 
checking, video sequences are captured by its cameras. 
Then the system requires the cooperation of person 
who has to turn left or right the head and provide 
his/her fingerprint to a sensor (or move eye to an iris 
movement tracker). The three dimensional facial object 
as a result helps system to separate an alive human 
from a photo. The matching parameters are scored 
under a fusion rule which its optimal threshold depends 
on both of them, as a mechanism against multi-
biometric template threats [20]. After judgment, the 
recognition procedure demands the use of final fusion 
score to extract from the database (chip) the 
cryptographic key and thus the informative content. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Flow chart of framework 
 
5.2. Usability and advantages 
 
Exploring the privacy and security usability of this 
method, authors respected the needs of such an 
impending worldwide next-generation authentication 
technology, as those were determined in admissible 
experiments [6]. The framework preserves data 
confidentiality as the initial biometric used for 
enrollment  and verification or authentication is 
minimal and can be only available for the creation of 
the pseudo-identity. The final chip does not store 
biometric information and is additionally transformed 
using one-way bit functions. The re-generation or 
revocation of the pseudo-references may be an answer 
to lost identity documents or compromised identities. 
This approach as a biometric template mechanism 
could be also useful for many other applications. For 
example using only identity cards or ePassports, if 
someone travells from one country to another, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
gaining access at his/her bank account [11].  The 
supporting architecture of RFID protection 
mechanisms provides extra security for sensitive 
information, such as birth date or nationality that are 
carried on passports.  
Liveness detection as an anti-spoofing 
countermeasure is nowadays among the most 
“acceptable” ways against spoofing of identity 
documents, during border control checks. The process 
can ensure the presence of the passport’s owner. 
Furthermore, analyzing the result of sensor on a three 
subject-specific 3D facial trait with local binary 
patterns and those data delivered after the cooperation 
of person, iris movement tracking or presenting his/her 
fingerprints, the system can be smart enough to 
understand a genuine user or not.  
The design requires the matching of many 
parameters that are scored under fusion rules, as a 
more tested method for better results in modalities like 
those used in our scheme. The optimal threshold 
depends on both of the strings “unlocked” under the 
presence of its biometric characteristic, something that 
can overcome the threat of exposure the whole 
template in multi-biometric template combinations 
[20]. The overall strings are cryptographically secured 
to proof that the judgment during the recognition 
procedure will minimize the false acceptance rates. 
Summarizing, this deployment definitely deserves a 
better analysis as it is just the first step of spoofing 
against next-generation identification systems. The 
encouraging part is the fact that this thought underlies 
on previously researches that emphasize how important 
is to combine all the current knowledge in 
cryptography to protect the biometric systems and the 
human rights to privacy. The anti-spoofing methods 
based on the cooperation of machine-user add a new 
layer to secure authentication, and relevant 
deployments after test and evaluation can benefit the 
needs of citizens, government and industry. 
 
5.3. Vulnerabilities and limitations 
 
The vulnerabilities of this framework found on 
false acceptance percentages for an imposter’s 
recognition and ingenious spoofing actions, under 
police presence and could be considered as worst-case 
assumptions. ICAO standards and ISO protocols 
through documents that unequivocally identify their 
bearers were assumed to guarantee the protection from 
the document forgery. RFID access control processes 
and other impacts on security issues in ePassports, 
even though they are a charming field, are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
As limitations of the design could be characterized 
the poor quality of the cryptographic methodologies 
used in  producing the pseudo-identities or/and score 
fusion rules results. The function is time consuming, 
regarding that it performs different steps to provide a 
final result. This is a significant drawback considering 
that it should be used as a method for border control 
with millions visitors daily. The facial recognition as 
the first and immutable part of this system is weak 
during liveness detection performances as the result 
may vary if the user moves the head fast, increasing the 
error rates. The fingerprints present shortcomings, as 
well, due to the fact that are affected by age. Finally, 
pseudo-identities have been implemented in 
applications only for fingerprints and it remains 
untested their performance in other biometric traits. 
Research about the function of the suggested model 
is currently aimed on tests on the pseudo-identities for 
other samples. Secondly, the selection of fusion rules 
will be carefully selected according to the need of the 
scheme, as those were underlined above. The final 
experiments will be conducted on datasets of “real” 
and spoofed biometric elements. The overall accuracy 
and privacy evaluation will be determinant for the 
acceptance of the methods.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The paper represents an attempt to acknowledge 
and account for the schemes using combination of 
cryptography with biometric characteristics and how 
this could play an increasing role in electronic 
documents and transactions for identifying a person, 
limiting security risks. Current methods and their 
design suffer from vulnerabilities, and here is where 
measures become crucial in order to protect schemes 
and the overall efficiency of government and 
commercial applications. Spoofing attacks at the sensor 
level of a system used for automatic recognition of 
people from their biometric characteristics have been 
tackled by independent and/or collaborated to initial 
design and application, anti-spoofing attempts [8]. To 
appraise data protection problems, multi-modalities, 
current research developments on suggestions against 
invasive actions and a prototype face-fingerprint/iris 
cryptosystem have been presented. Create an all-
inclusive view, we believe that this project will help to 
better evaluate the impact of spoofing attacks from a 
security and privacy engineering aspect, contributing to 
ongoing and expected attempts in pattern recognition 
area. 
In outcome’s atmosphere, the application of 
biometrics in different services requires high accuracy 
rates, secure personal information storage and reliable 
generation of data while the whole process of transfer 
is proof. Identity thief might exploit in occasion of low 
protection levels. Even so, some modalities are more 
robust than others, however, this should not be 
interpreted as meaning they are more reliable [1]. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Spoofing and countermeasure assessments are a 
complex part for each study as it is mandatory to think 
all the involved possibilities and design generic 
frameworks with a manageable impact of usability. 
Challenge-response approaches seem to be 
supplementary to the traditional ones and more 
effective for risky applications. The standard 
evaluation methodology during the phases of the 
architecture can lead to better independent networks 
and fused countermeasures as a valuable strategy.  
 For some conditions, even if anti-spoofing 
measures could adequately assessed, the rapid progress 
of adversaries’ actions at the initial steps of verification 
purposes throw up wider concerns on public narratives 
of privacy and frequent monitoring of individuals. The 
advancement of theory on secured access control and 
practical design implementations of the provided 
valuable experience on technologies will improve their 
robustness.   
 
7. Future research 
 
Directions for further research and open issues may 
be focused on anti-spoofing techniques for biometric 
multi-modalities and their combinations, seeking to 
reduce the different degrees of deception/lying, while 
enhancing the proper function of the system. An anti-
spoofing method is not constructed to operate as a 
stand-alone procedure but together with the biometric 
recognition system. The design must be in a way that 
does not suffer from error recognition rates itself. 
Cryptography can offer significant, but inadequate 
solutions in this emerging technology, and thus next 
steps on encryption schemes may promote the security 
strength against intrusive attacks. Multi-biometric 
systems can be easily cracked by spoofing only one 
trait and future works should flatly investigate how to 
bring robust results on score level fusion rules and 
provide protocols for provable secure authentication 
based on template protection schemes. 
From another angle, state-of-the-art suggests the 
use of databases for spoofing and anti-spoofing 
analysis but still lacks to cover all the possible 
scenarios and certainly the implementation in real-
world applications. The problem of generalization 
should be addressed as well, due to the fact that current 
findings may cover individual occasions for some 
biometric traits, leaving gaps to varying areas of a 
system that verifies or identifies biometrically users. 
Concurrently, the missing pieces of the puzzle for 
better approaches may lie at the combination of 
different anti-spoofing algorithms. Liveness detection 
efforts, and challenge approaches with the cooperation 
of user, could be tested to offer advantages versus 
tricks that can fool existing systems. 
Apart from design ideas and open research 
questions on the protected operation of the system, the 
major themes of human privacy and rights to 
anonymization, facing the obstacles of societal 
suspicions over surveillance, and other specified and 
legitimate services should be covered. Decisively, the 
starting setup is vital for the entire field. Human 
biometrics may be collected and processed under 
detailed protocols, only compatible and accordingly 
related to the scope of the authority involved in the 
transaction, always respecting proportionality and 
serving the forensic experts thoughts on the prevention 
of spoofing, where we may profit more from a careful 
appraisal of the processes, supporting the structure of 
the biometric system. 
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